Oh...I said "sane person." I forgot that we're dealing with the Bush administration, here. My apologies.

Of course, they've given us their "reasons" for what appears to me to be a glaring difference in strategy which would have made me wonder why we're really gung ho for invading Iraq, if I didn't already wonder about it anyway. From today's NY Times:

Weighing 'Deterrence' vs. 'Aggression'

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 � The Bush administration responded today to the disclosure of North Korea's nuclear weapons program with a strategy of urgent diplomatic pressure free of military threats or even a tone of crisis. It was a marked contrast with the drumbeat of warnings about force and the mobilization of troops against Iraq, also a member of the "axis of evil" identified by President Bush, but one he says poses the most serious danger to the United States.

The two separate and in some respects contradictory strategies reflected the administration's desire not to let North Korea derail Washington's plans to confront Saddam Hussein. The risk was that some Americans might wonder why conciliation ought not to be tried toward both countries.

Aides to Mr. Bush were quick to assert that the two situations are entirely different.

"There is not one policy that fits all," said Richard A. Boucher, the State Department spokesman. "Each situation has to be dealt with on its own."

Administration officials say that although Iraq probably does not yet have nuclear weapons, it poses a more serious threat to its region because its record of using chemical weapons against its enemies and of invading two neighboring countries in the past.

Whereas North Korea is described by many experts as wanting weapons to deter an invasion, Iraq is feared generally as a nation willing to use its weapons to bully others. This concern is what the administration says justifies its policy of pre-emptive action against Baghdad.

"North Korea is a fundamentally conservative dictatorship," said a former diplomat who has dealt with the Korean peninsula over three decades. "They're the worst kind of totalitarian regime, and their willingness to cheat is unquestioned. But they do not pose an imminent threat to regional stability. The fundamental threat from North Korea is still deterred by the presence of American troops in South Korea. So the administration is right to focus on Iraq."

A State Department official said Iraq was different from North Korea not simply because Baghdad had used weapons of mass destruction and has ties with terrorists, but because North Korea had proved itself to be "at least sometimes susceptible to international pressure." As a result, he said, diplomacy was justified, at least for now.

The administration's low-key strategy toward North Korea was being carried out by the four partners with which it has been working for years to coax North Korea into living peacefully with its neighbors. The clear hope at the White House was that the four � Japan, South Korea, China and Russia � could salvage the possibility of negotiation to remove an advanced nuclear threat from a nation as isolated, dictatorial and unpredictable as any on earth.

For Iraq, by contrast, the administration was continuing to threaten to use force as a way of bludgeoning President Hussein to accept inspections of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, followed by disarmament.

Perhaps inevitably, many policy makers focused today on why engagement with North Korea � which included the implication that economic aid could resume some day � might not also be valid for Baghdad.

"The American reaction shows you the difference between dealing with a country that already may have nuclear weapons, and one that doesn't," said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms and a leading expert on nuclear proliferation issues.

As early as 1993, the North Koreans were thought to have one or two nuclear bombs from their plutonium program, and the latest revelations about their parallel development of highly enriched uranium means they could have more.

This means, according to Mr. Milhollin, that North Korea could have the capacity to attack Tokyo, Seoul or even the United States right now, which necessitates a cautious approach. Indeed, North Korea's artillery, rockets and other conventional weapons � which experts say could easily destroy large parts of Seoul � have for decades served as a deterrent against any possibility of an attack by the United States.

Military experts say that for all its erratic conduct, North Korea is not planning to blackmail or coerce neighboring countries.

In some ways, the purpose of North Korea's nuclear program is viewed by diplomatic experts as analogous to that of Pakistan's. Just as Pakistan has moved to acquire such weapons to counter the threat presented by India, these experts say, North Korea has acquired nuclear arms to protect itself from being overrun by South Korea, a fear that pervades everything from government propaganda to children's textbooks.

Another factor lessening the urgency of North Korea as a threat, and leading Americans to believe that diplomacy may still work, is the country's nearly desperate state of poverty and starvation. For years North Korea has had to rely on outsiders to help feed its people, the very outsiders who will now demand that it dismantle its nuclear program.

The need for outside help has led to several conciliatory gestures, including the recent repatriation of kidnap victims to Japan, family exchanges with South Korea and apologies for some of its past egregious spying and aggression.

Indeed, if the United States ever entertained any idea of confronting North Korea, it would likely meet resistance from its two closest allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, for example, was quick to say today that Japan would continue to try to engage North Korea despite the latest developments.

If there was disagreement over how to handle North Korea in the Bush administration, which was divided early last year, it was not evident today. That could have been because the so-called hawks and doubters who have criticized past conciliatory moves toward North Korea are now preoccupied with mounting a military action against Iraq.

For North Korea, at least, the negotiating approach is back in fashion for now, and an administration filled with officials critical of the 1994 Clinton-era accord under which the North promised to give up its nuclear weapons program is working to see if the agreement can be revived and made foolproof.

Copyright The New York Times Company

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