At the Short End of the Axis of Evil: Some F.A.Q.'s

By BILL KELLER

...Why are we suddenly in this mess?

The Bush folks will tell you it's Bill Clinton's fault. The Clinton folks say it's George W. Bush's fault. Both administrations have plenty to answer for, but first and foremost it's the North Koreans' fault. Back in 1994, facing a similar threat of the North going nuclear, the Clinton administration cut a deal called the Agreed Framework. North Korea promised to put its nuclear program on hold and act nice, and the U.S. said it would reward this good behavior by supplying fuel oil and a pair of relatively safe light-water nuclear reactors, and by moving to normalize relations. The deal had some holes, but it averted a crisis that could have led to war. And it worked, up to a point. The North Koreans did lock up their precious plutonium at the Yongbyon reactor. But they also started a secret uranium enrichment program and tested a worrisome new long-range missile over Japan. The Clintonites � afraid they would be accused of appeasing an awful regime, and half-convinced that that regime would collapse anyway � dithered and dawdled on our end of the bargain.

So the Bush administration inherited a mess.

And proceeded to turn it into a bigger mess. Mr. Bush came in with an attitude rather than a policy. The attitude was that Kim Jong Il was despicable, and that bargaining with him would be immoral. Mr. Bush called Mr. Kim a "pygmy," told a reporter he "loathed" him, inducted him into the axis of evil. The North Koreans have spewed enough hysterical invective of their own � they once called us "cannibals," and this week they were bellowing about World War III � to recognize bluster when it's aimed at them, but they seem to have taken our bellicose talk fairly seriously. Especially when we abruptly cut off discussions, adopted military "pre-emption" as our doctrine for dealing with nuclear wannabes, and cited North Korea as a justification for building a missile defense system in Alaska. When Donald Rumsfeld pointed out that our military is designed to fight two wars at the same time, guess what he meant...

Robert Galucci, who negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework, says he has no doubt President Clinton would have ordered a pre-emptive air strike if the Koreans had moved to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons. Mr. Bush has the same option, and, faced with the prospect of North Korea opening a nuclear bazaar, he would have to think very seriously about it. If we hit a reprocessing plant in North Korea with cruise missiles, North Korea would then have to decide whether to begin a second Korean War by raining artillery shells on South Korea, where 37,000 U.S. troops are based. Most experts are pretty sure it will not come to this. The North Koreans have made a show of expelling international inspectors and withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but they have not repudiated their deal with us, the Agreed Framework. Mitchell Reiss, the Korea specialist who is dean of international relations at the College of William and Mary, believes they have slyly closed off everything but this bilateral avenue, so the U.S. will talk to them directly. Of course, experts have been wrong a time or two about North Korea.

Plan A sounds pretty horrible. Does the president have a Plan B?

He has zigzagged his way through a whole alphabet of plans. One faction within the administration has pushed for a policy of tightening economic sanctions until North Korea cries uncle or collapses. (A Bush official dubbed this form of strangulation "tailored containment." Mr. Reiss calls it "assisted suicide.")

Whatever you call it, I don't follow the logic. You say North Korea is an isolated totalitarian state that has never learned how to conduct itself in polite society. So the way to teach it better manners is to cut it off?

(Karen's insertion: Yeah, because it's worked so well in Cuba, right?)

Look, sanctions are everybody's cheap solution for countries behaving badly. Liberals love them when the target is South Africa or Myanmar. Conservatives love them when the target is Cuba or Iraq. Sanctions often accomplish exactly the opposite of what you want, and even at their best they have deleterious side effects. One longtime sanctions skeptic, Richard Haass, has written that in the case of North Korea, economic pressure should be only a last resort if engagement fails, not a substitute for dialogue. Mr. Haass, by the way, is now the director of policy planning at the Bush State Department.

Which raises the question, who's in charge there?

At the outset the Bush policy was dominated by people whose expertise is not Asia but weapons proliferation. Now the lead role has reverted to Colin Powell and the diplomats. They have renounced "tailored containment" and forsworn military options so vociferously that Mr. Bush now sounds like Jimmy Carter. True, his motives for this show of restraint may be questionable � he doesn't want to distract attention from Job One in Iraq � but it's a welcome change from the gunslinger talk. We've also started paying more attention to North Korea's neighbors, whose cooperation is essential. Japan, Russia, China and especially South Korea, whose new president floated to power on a wave of anti-American sentiment, all believe Mr. Kim can be induced to sober up and maybe even join the world. Most important, we've agreed to "talk" to the North. (But not "negotiate." It's basically the difference between foreplay and sex.) Whether the Bush folks have come entirely to their senses is hard to tell, but Mr. Galucci describes them as "lurching in the right direction."

Does anybody have a plan that makes sense?

Actually, yes. Back in 1999 the National Defense University assembled a team of Asia experts to draft a strategy for dealing with North Korea. It came to be known as "more for more": we would expect more from the North Koreans, including rigorous inspections, a full accounting of their nuclear history, and an end to missile exports. We would offer more in return � financial aid (including speeding construction of the two promised light-water reactors, which are stalled), guarantees that North Korea will not be attacked if it keeps its promises, and eventually normal diplomatic relations. The plan contained a dash of testosterone � intercepting missile exports, even a cautious mention of "pre-emption" if all else fails � but mostly it depended on lots and lots of, pardon the expression, negotiations and quid pro quo. The proposal was comprehensive, hard-nosed, multilateral and level-headed.

Maybe President Bush should hire the guy in charge of that report.

He already has. It's Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Maybe what Mr. Bush should do now is listen to him.

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company

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